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Russia's economy is still in a deep crisis. As a
result of 5 years of reforms its GNP dropped by 40%,
industrial production - by 50%, agricultural produc-
tion - by 30%, investments into economy decreased
5 times, population income went down by 40%, in-
ternal and external debt shot up to $ 77 bln.
Among the reasons for such a situation are:
disintegration of the integral economic complex of
the former Soviet Union; need for restructuring of
the remaining economic potential and creation of the
independent Russian economy; mistakes in defining
strategy of transition to market economy and lack of
unity among parties and politicians of democratic
and market orientation on major issues of the
country's development. Simultaneously the ongoing
market reforms were slowed down by:
- lack of transparent and stable market legislation
(some laws are imperfect, others: product sharing,
land ownership, mortgage system, etc. are still in the
process of political debates);
- ineffective taxation policy and poor tax collection
resulting in widely spread tax evasions and capital
flight out of the country;
- high level of crime and corruption both in business
and governmental institutions;
- non-payments affecting almost every sector of the
economy.
Half of the country's money turnover is in the
"gray" economy, not yielding any tax money to the
national coffers. Vodka, for instance, was Russian
permanent liquid currency. In Soviet times it con-
tributed to the state budget up to 35% of revenues,
now its production and sale are bringing only 1.5 -
2%. Quite often tax services and criminal world are
closing ranks. As a result 50% of all non-payments
to the national budget are "legal" thanks to benefits
and privileges approved by tax officials on behalf of
the state. Ineffective policy toward natural monopo-
lies proved to be damaging to the production sector
of the economy. Newly re-shuffled Government is
planning to introduce a regulation mechanism to
correct the situation in oil and gas industries, rail-
way transportation system, electric power energy
system by limiting prices and introducing competi-
tiveness. New Tax Code will be adopted soon.
This gloomy picture is sweetened by the re-
sults of the economic development in the first quar-
ter of this year. Figures show that the country is over-
coming the most acute stage of the crisis. The GNP
will grow by 3% this year and annual inflation will
slide down to below 14% (48% in 1996).
Political picture of Russian life is multicol-
ored. Both the President and the Government when
taking decisions are often faced with tough opposi-
tion both from political forces of the democratic ori-
entation and from the "leftists".
On Superpower and Great Power Status
Despite rhetoric sometimes heard from the
State Duma, most politicians realize that the United
States is the only country at present capable of pro-
jecting on a global scale its power and influence
based on the strongest and effective economy as well
as on the technologically perfect military machine.
One might think that under the existing favourable
conditions the US should have no worries about its
security. But some analysts say that this is not the
case and the US is worried by the prospect oflosing
the present status. Their assessment was supported
by the analysis presented at the US Senate hearings
"Present and Perspective Threats to the US Secu-
rity" held last February. Taking part in the hearings
were the heads of the American Intelligence bodies
(1. Tenet, P.Hews, T. Gaty). They named the follow-
ing challenges to the US security:
1. Continuing transformation of Russia and China.
2. Hostile behaviour of North Korea, Iran and Iraq.
3. Transnational problems - terrorism, proliferation
ofMDW, organized crime, narcotics.
4. Hot spots in the Middle East, Southern Asia,
Bosnia.
5. Civil wars, ethnic conflicts, hunger in some areas
of the world.
Russia and China are placed first among the
challenges and threats to the US security. American
Administration continues to view Russia as a source
of instability and a potential adversary. It was also
noted that Moscow is trying to uphold its status of
great power by strengthening ties with Germany,
France, China, Japan expecting equal rights in solv-
ing international issues and, first of all, in shaping
European security architecture and defining NATO's
role in this process. Opinion was voiced at the hear-
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ings that despite its present feeble state of economy,
Russia remains a nuclear superpower, the only coun-
try capable of inflicting unacceptable damage to the
USA.
As for Russia, the absolute majority of sen-
sible politicians share the opinion that the debates
on the superpower status are inessential. Of primary
importance is revival of national economy and up-
holding vital interests and rights in the political talks.
Hence latest steps aimed at building new multi-po-
lar world order and opposing claims of any country
on an exclusive role in the post-Cold War world.
Europe and Russia need Each Other
Interest of economic development, national
security, geopolitical situation and, broadly speak-
ing, common European culture and history call for
stepping up all-round relations between Russia and
other European countries, political and economic
alliances and the EU in particular, being the most
powerful amalgamation on the continent.
In June 1994 Russia and the EU signed an
Agreement which will come into force after ratifica-
tion by all countries of the Union and Russia. The
document lays down a legal basis for co-operation
both in political and business fields. It rates Russia
as a country with transitional economy (presently it
is still considered by the West as a country with state-
controlled economy and trade). This step alone will
help removing import quotas for over 600 types of
Russian goods. To promote co-operation and resolve
arising disputes Russia and EU agreed to set up a
mechanism resembling institutions existing between
Washington and Brussels as well as between Russia
and the USA (A. Gore - V. Chernomyrdin Commis-
sion), in other words, regular (twice a year) top-level
meetings, foreign ministers meetings, permanent
commission, Parliamentary committee, exchange of
ambassadors. United Business Congress, a non-gov-
ernmental organization of Russian and European en-
trepreneurs, is in the process of being established.
Policy and practical steps of the RF Govern-
ment aimed at developing closer relations based on
equality and partnership with the EU and its struc-
tures enjoy support of the Russian society and the
majority of political parties and movements, with the
exception of extreme "leftists".
The EU leadership also realizes the need for
Russia's gradual integration into the fabric of Euro-
pean economy and more active involvement in the
process of consolidating stability and security on the
continent. Both in Europe and in Russia opinions
prevail that full integration of Russia into Europe is
not a matter of the nearest future. Russia needs to
put its economy, finances, tax system, relevant leg-
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islation in order while the EU, on the other hand, is
expected to take practical steps and remove discrimi-
nation and trade barriers. Meantime practical deeds
of the West do not always agree with the declara-
tions. Russia was repeatedly promised membership
in the "G-7", London and Paris Clubs, WTO, how-
ever the promises have not materialized yet.
But even under present unfavourable condi-
tions the EU is Russia's major trading and invest-
ment partner: 40% of its export goes to the EU mar-
kets (at the same time 6% - to China, 4% - to the US,
25% - to all CIS countries), 60% of foreign invest-
ments are coming to Russia from the EU countries.
At the same time, Russia welcomes acceptance
of new members from Central and Eastern Europe
to the EU believing that in this case Europe will be
leaning less toward force and more toward economic
well-being as the guarantor of security. Whereas
NATO's expansion might slow down integration pro-
cess and bring about considerable financial expenses.
In Russia NATO's prominent role in European po-
litical system is fully realized. Actually it is not a
question of NATO as a whole, Russia is concerned
about a military component of the alliance, its trans-
formation plans.
NATO's Eastward Expansion.
Search for Compromise
As much as all prominent Russian politicians
are united in their support for the European integra-
tion in economic, humanitarian, cultural, business
spheres, so much they all oppose NATO's expan-
sion into Eastern Europe. Even the leader of the lib-
eral pro-Western "Yabolko" movement G. Yavlinsky
noted that "it's absurd to believe in NATO's peace-
ful intentions", he also added that "many centuries
of history teach us that Russia's weakness should
not be exploited, the country will survive and be
strong again". Former Soviet President M.
Gorbachev speaking to the US Congressional Com-
mittee warned NATO against treating Russia the way
victorious allies severely restrained Germany after
World War I. "You cannot humiliate a people with-
out consequences". Leftist and nationalist leaders
express similar ideas. Still the reasons that bring such
different political forces into the anti-NATO "na-
tional consensus" are very different. Liberals feel
they have been betrayed and the expansion could
terminate all meaningful co-operation between Rus-
sia and the West. Communists, nationalists and some
of the generals say: "We told you so: we move our
forces out and "they" move in". Of course, every-
body understands that all European countries are sov-
ereign states, independent subjects of international
law and it's up to them to decide which alliance to
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join. Similarly it is within Moscow's rights to ex-
plains why it opposes this expansion. Among
Russia's major concerns are military build up near
its borders, the emergence of new dividing lines in
Europe. North Atlantic Alliance first of all is an
armed force temporarily at peace complete with Su-
preme allied HQs for the Atlantic and for Europe, a
hierarchy of subordinate regional commands, intel-
Iigence staffs in each HQ, a joint surveillance force
of AWACs aircraft, an air defense network from
Norway to Turkey and an elaborate strategic infra-
structure. Though NATO officials repeat time and
again that the alliance does not have any plans or
intentions to attack Russia, it is perceived here that
NATO has not changed enough as declared before
for Russia not to feel threatened.
NATO's Transformation.
History of the Question
In the beginning of the 90-s as a result of his-
toric changes in Europe, NATO's transformation into
political-military organization (more political) began.
There was a declaration adopted at the NATO's
Council session in Copenhagen that "the alliance will
not try to obtain any unilateral advantages following
the changes in Europe. Softening of political and
military doctrines went ahead. In military sphere
NATO abandoned the strategy of forward deploy-
ment and instead began to set up limited mobile
forces and withdraw the forces from Central Europe
forward lines.
Signing the "Partnership for Peace" documents
Russia was guided by the understanding that the ex-
pansion, if it ever happens, would take place only
after deep transformation of NATO's military ele-
ment.
Under present conditions Russian diplomats
and politicians are faced with a complicated task -
how to defend Russia's national interests despite
missed opportunities and lost time during 1993-1996
combined with very negative for Russia balance of
forces. A vigorous campaign was launched to ex-
plain Russian position and to reach an understand-
ing with the U.S.A. and the European leaders on the
key issues of the European security structure. At the
US-Russia summit in Helsinki positions were defined
in detail and 5 declarations approved.
I. Declaration on European Security. Both
sides recognized the leading role of the OSCE in the
European security architecture and the need for build-
ing up operational capacity ofthis organization while
preserving consensus principle in decision-taking.
They also agreed on the necessity of NATO's deep
transformation and regular consultations with Rus-
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sia in the course of this process. Moreover, the sides
stated their willingness to sign an agreement on re-
visions of the CFE before the summer of 1997, that
is prior to NATO's decision on new members (this is
vital for Russia's security interests since after the
end of the Cold War half of the European countries
were not covered by the CFE limitations).
Within the framework of this declaration an
accord was reached on signing by the heads of states
of the alliance and the RF President a "Russia-NATO
document". It is a very high level, however taking into
account a somewhat "liberal" interpretation by the
West of promises and declarations given to the Soviet
and Russian politicians at the highest levels. This time
Russia insists on a legally binding agreement (West-
ern politicians prefer to call it a Charter, in Russia - an
agreement). The document could be given not neces-
sarily juridical but probably an international binding
status through supporting it by the UN and OSCE.
One might suggest the following scenario - all heads
of states and governments get together and sign an
agreement like the Helsinki Act or Vienna Code in
the presence of the UN Secretary General.
Principle of consultations with Russia on vi-
tal security issues was also proclaimed, but without
obligations on the alliance's part to take account of
Russia's concerns. In this respect, many experts be-
lieve that the Russian leadership should unilaterally
and definitely state (in the written form and not nec-
essarily signed by the Western partners) those limits
violations of which would automatically lead to the
Agreement break off and dispute escalation.
2. Declarations on START-2 Prolongation, on
Signing START-3, on Missile Defense Treaty and
on Chemical Weapons were all related to the Euro-
pean security matters. The positive aspect of these
declarations is that the sides showed willingness to
reach mutually acceptable solutions based on the
balance of interests. Nevertheless some problems
with the START-3 and Missile Defense Treaty re-
mained to be solved. Europe which would mean not
military but primarily political version of the
alliance's expansion and correspondingly political,
not military-political response from Russia.
I
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Adherence to the Balance of Interests
Principle is the Right Way
to Comprehensive Security
In the recent years, for the majority of Rus-
sian politicians the conception of all-embracing se-
curity assumes more pragmatic character, devoid of
any ideological influences. To the foreground comes
out security of the Russian state proper, closely tied
to the Armed Forces development and reform, struc-
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tural changes and modernization of armaments - ev-
erything strictly within economic means and re-
sources of the country.
Experience of the last decade shows that the
Western countries, the USA in particular, encourag-
ing in every possible way reforms in Russia, sup-
porting disarmament agreements aimed at sealing
down Russia's military might, at the same time, once
and again demonstrate to Russia that the weak in
this world does not deserve respect and is not counted
with.
Examples could be given when the West did
not try to find balanced approaches in cases when its
interests differed with those of Russia.
Russia views territories of the former Soviet
Union as the major priority of its foreign policy and
security, considering them "area of vital interest".
Special status of the "near abroad" is explained by
the fact that only 5 years ago all these countries to-
gether with Russia comprised a single economic,
energy, transportation and military system. There
remained (very often against their will) 25 mln people
considering themselves to be Russians. Not a single
area declared by Washington as the area of its "vital
interest", including Canada and Mexico, is as close
to the US interests from the point of view of life-
sustenance and security, as the "near abroad" to Rus-
sia. In Moscow opinion prevails, and not without
ground, that the West is not interested in Russia's
integration with the CIS countries and opposes the
process even in case of economic integration on
purely voluntary basis. The fate of the Russian speak-
ing population in the countries of the former Soviet
Union, violations of their basic human rights and free-
doms are beyond concerns and interest of human
rights organizations and activists in Europe.
Another example, exports of nuclear technolo-
gies and materials and armaments trade. It is getting
evident that the West is attempting to squeeze Rus-
sia out of the traditional Soviet markets supplanting
the demand by their own deliveries (in Central Eu-
rope, North Korea, India, Iran, Cuba). At the same
time steps are being taken to bar Russia from tradi-
tional Western markets (Latin America, South East
Asia, Persian Gulf) by employing methods and
mechanisms which hardly resemble rules of fair mar-
ket competition.
History of the talks between Russia and the
West shows that the real progress is achieved mainly
in the leaders' friendship and disarmament. The
friendship started with pledges of help to Russian
reforms. Assistance package of $ 1.3 bln. promised
by the United States in Vancouver in 1993 has not
come about. At the "G-7" meeting in Tokyo (1993)
the figure rose to $ 43.4 bIn. - with the same result.
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President B. Clinton's visit to Moscow (1994) re-
sulted in the Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. The
same year at the meeting of the "G-7" in Naples Presi-
dent B. Yeltsin was assured that the organization
would turn into the "G-8" and help Russia to enter
WTO. If these promises were timely realized, reforms
in Russia would have received real help (access to
credits, removal oftrade barriers) and social tensions
and society division would not have been so acute.
Described above views and opinions on the
role of Western countries in Russia's reforms are the
result of democratic discussions, based on the expe-
rience of the Russia-West relations in the course of
last years. Many examples such as continuing trade
restrictions and country's isolation from leading eco-
nomic institutions, enlargement of a military alliance
supply sufficient grounds for many Russians to be-
lieve that their country is treated by the West from
the position of strength. Such policy towards Mos-
cow is fraught with growing misunderstandings, frus-
trations, conflicts. And in many cases it will be even
more difficult to reach compromises and solutions
with Russia than with the Soviet Union during the
Cold War when the Kremlin didn't suffer of inferi-
ority complex and didn't care about a parliament,
mass media or elections.
Slow progress of economic reforms and un-
fair, from the Russian point of view, economic rela-
tions with the West are closely linked to NATO's
enlargement and European security in general. The
enlargement will lead to the unlimited influence of
the alliance on the continent. Assuming the role of
the only arbiter in international affairs NATO (pos-
sessing the most powerful military potential) would
be able not resorting to force but only by the threat
of force to decide all disputable issues in its favour.
A principally new security model based on the
balance of interest of all European countries is seen
as a preferable solution, including balance of inter-
ests between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements
under the auspices of the OSCE could be seen as a
legal foundation of the model. There will probably
be a need to form a Security Council (similar to the
UN Security Council) with the responsibility oftak-
ing vital decisions and implementing them into life.
The NATO allied force as well as the national armed
forces could gradually assume the role of all-Euro-
pean peace-keeping institution. •
